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INVESTMENT SECURITIES: BEYOND THE
SCOPE OF CALIFORNIA'S CONSUMERS
LEGAL REMEDIES ACT?
Melinda Rose Smolin*
I. INTRODUCTION
The consumer revolution of the 1960s inaugurated a new age in con-
sumer rights.' In 1970 the California State Legislature responded to this
revolt by enacting the Consumers Legal Remedies Act (the Act).' The
Act protects consumers from unfair trade practices by outlawing enu-
merated deceptive acts.3 The Act provides wronged consumers with effi-
cient and economical redress in the way of damages, injunctive relief, and
* B.A., 1985, University of California, Berkeley; J.D., 1989, Loyola Law School, Los
Angeles. Ms. Smolin practices with the law firm of Rogers & Wells in Los Angeles, California.
1. See James S. Reed, Legislating For The Consumer: An Insider's Analysis of the Con-
sumers Legal Remedies Act, 2 PAC. L.J. 1, 5-7 (1971) for a discussion of the consumer revolt
that preceded the enactment of the Consumers Legal Remedies Act:
Uinfortunately the low income, unsophisticated person is most often the victim of
deceptive sales practices.... The Kerner Commission found that much of the vio-
lence in recent urban disorders was directed at stores and other commercial establish-
ments in disadvantaged neighborhoods. Rioters seemed to focus on stores operated
by merchants who, they believed, had been charging exorbitant prices or selling in-
ferior goods.
Id. at 5. "The... Act... represents an attempt to alleviate the effects of these very real social
and economic problems." Id. at 6-7.
2. Consumers Legal Remedies Act, ch. 1550, § 1, 1970 Cal. Stat. 3157 (codified as
amended at CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750-1784 (West 1985 & Supp. 1991)). California consumers
may also seek redress for consumer fraud under other statutes. See, eg., Unfair Practices Act,
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17000-17101 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991) (providing injunctive
relief for use of deceptive business practices and false advertising).
3. The deceptive practices prohibited under the Act are listed in CAL. CIV. CODE § 1770
(West 1985 & Supp. 1991). This section states:
The following unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or prac-
tices undertaken by any person in a transaction intended to result or which results in
the sale or lease of goods or services to any consumer are unlawful:
(a) Passing off goods or services as those of another.
(b) Misrepresenting the source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods
or services.
(c) Misrepresenting the affiliation, connection, or association with, or certifica-
tion by, another.
(d) Using deceptive representations or designations of geographic origin in con-
nection with goods or services.
(e) Representing that goods or services have sponsorship, approval, characteris-
tics, ingredients, uses, benefits, or quantities which they do not have or that a person
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"correction and replacement" procedures.4 Recovery under the Act is
has a sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection which he or she does
not have.
(f) Representing that goods are original or new if they have deteriorated unrea-
sonably or are altered, reconditioned, reclaimed, used, or secondhand.
(g) Representing that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, or
grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are of another.
(h) Disparaging the goods, services, or business of another by false or mislead-
ing representation of fact.
(i) Advertising goods or services with intent not to sell them as advertised.
(j) Advertising goods or services with intent not to supply reasonably expect-
able demand, unless the advertisement discloses a limitation of quantity.
(k) Advertising furniture without clearly indicating that it is unassembled if
such is the case.
(1) Advertising the price of unassembled furniture without clearly indicating the
assembled price of such furniture if the same furniture is available assembled from
the seller.
(m) Making false or misleading statements of fact concerning reasons for, exist-
ence of, or amounts of price reductions.
(n) Representing that a transaction confers or involves rights, remedies, or obli-
gations which it does not have or involve, or which are prohibited by law.
(o) Representing that a part, replacement, or repair service is needed when it is
not.
(p) Representing that the subject of a transaction has been supplied in accord-
ance with a previous representation when it has not.
(q) Representing that the consumer will receive a rebate, discount, or other eco-
nomic benefit, if the earning of the benefit is contingent on an event to occur subse-
quent to the consummation of the transaction.
(r) Misrepresenting the authority of a salesperson, representative, or agent to
negotiate the final terms of a transaction with a consumer.
(s) Inserting an unconscionable provision in the contract.
(t) Advertising that a product is being offered at a specific price plus a specific
percentage of that price unless (1) the total price is set forth in the advertisement,
which may include, but is not limited to, shelf tags, displays, and media advertising,
in a size larger than any other price in that advertisement, and (2) the specific price
plus a specific percentage of that price represents a markup from the seller's costs or
from the wholesale price of the product ....
(u) Selling or leasing goods in violation of Chapter 4 ....
(v)(1) Disseminating an unsolicited prerecorded message by telephone without
an unrecorded, natural voice first informing the person answering the telephone of
the name of the caller or the organization being represented, and either the address
or the telephone number of the caller, and without obtaining the consent of that
person to listen to the prerecorded message ....
Id.
4. In contrast to CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200-17208, 17500-17509 (West 1988 &
Supp. 1991), the Act permits recovery by consumers of damages, and consumers may recover
both individually and in the form of a class action. See Chern v. Bank of America, 15 Cal. 3d
866, 875, 544 P.2d 1310, 1315, 127 Cal. Rptr. 110, 115 (1976) (consumers may not recover
damages for false or misleading statements under California Code of Business and Profes-
sions). See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1781 (West 1985 & Supp. 1991) for the Act's provision on
consumer class actions. Under § 1780, consumers are entitled to the following types of
recovery:
(1) Actual damages, but in no case shall the total award of damages in a class action
be less than one thousand dollars ($1,000).
(2) An order enjoining such methods, acts, or practices.
(3) Restitution of property.
(4) Punitive damages.
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expressly limited to the sale of consumer "goods" and "services." 5
Neither the express language of the Act nor its legislative history, how-
ever, explain what is meant by the terms "goods" or "services." No Cali-
fornia appellate court has directly interpreted the Act's consumer goods
or services prerequisite.
The Act expresses only two specific exemptions; it neither exempts
nor includes investment securities. 6 Whether investment securities are
consumer goods or services under the Act remains an open question in
California.7
(5) Any other relief which the court deems proper ....
(d) The court shall award court costs and attorney's fees to a prevailing defendant in
litigation filed pursuant to this section. Reasonable attorney's fees may be awarded
to a prevailing defendant upon a finding by the court that the plaintiff's prosecution
of the action was not in good faith.
Id. § 1780 (West 1985 & Supp. 1991). This statute also sets forth the Act's notice and demand
provisions requiring that a plaintiff-consumer make written demands to merchants for correc-
tion, repair or replacement before suing under the Act. Id. § 1782 (West 1985).
5. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1770 (West 1985 & Supp. 1991). The goods or services prerequi-
site is stated as follows: "The following unfair methods of competition ... undertaken by any
person in a transaction ... which results in the sale or lease of goods or services to any con-
sumer are unlawful. . . ." Id. (emphasis added).
6. The specific exclusions under the Act involve construction transactions and advertis-
ing media. Id. § 1754 (West 1985). Section 1754 states in pertinent part:
The provisions of this title shall not apply to any transaction which provides for the
construction, sale, or construction and sale of an entire residence or all or part of a
structure designed for commercial or industrial occupancy, with or without a parcel
of real property or an interest therein, or for the sale of a lot or parcel of real
property....
Id. Section 1755 states:
Nothing in this title shall apply to the owners or employees of any advertising me-
dium, including, but not limited to, newspapers, magazines, broadcast stations, bill-
boards and transit ads, by whom any advertisement in violation of this title is
published or disseminated, unless it is established that such owners or employees had
knowledge of the deceptive methods, acts or practices declared to be unlawful by
section 1770.
Id. § 1755 (West 1985).
7. Recent developments in California law make the inquiry of whether the Act encom-
passes investment securities a timely one. Recent California and federal court decisions have
broadly construed the phrase "unfair competition," as used in comprehensive general liability
insurance policies, as including statutory definitions of unfair competition-as opposed to nar-
rower common law definitions-for purposes of triggering an insurance company's duty to
defend. Statutory definitions of unfair competition broadly define unfair competition as unfair
business practices. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 1987). If a broad interpreta-
tion is employed, the Act could fall within the unfair competition definition for purposes of
determining an insurance company's duty to defend. If unfair business pra&ices are covered
by comprehensive general liability insurance policies as "advertising injuries," and if a plaintiff
may sue for securities violations under the Act, then allegations brought under the Act may
give rise to an insurer's duty to defend.
The scope of the phrase unfair competition was recently addressed in two California ap-
pellate court cases. Although the California Supreme Court has granted rehearing in these
cases, and accordingly vacated the appellate court decisions, the issue is discussed in these
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The question of whether securities are covered under the Act is per-
tinent because the Act permits recovery for both attorney's fees and pu-
nitive damages, unlike California or federal securities laws.' The
attorney's fees provision, added in 1988, makes the Act a particularly
attractive theory for securities plaintiffs.9
In fact, securities plaintiffs in many other jurisdictions have asserted
claims under similar consumer statutes for what are essentially securities
violations.'" The new attorney's fees clause is a compelling invitation to
cases. See Demonet Indus. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 227 Cal. App. 3d 744, 278 Cal. Rtpr.
178, review granted, 810 P.2d 997, 281 Cal. Rptr. 765 (1991); Bank of the West v. Superior
Court, 226 Cal. App. 3d 835, 277 Cal. Rptr. 219, review granted, 807 P.2d 1006, 279 Cal.
Rptr. 777 (1991).
In Bank of the West, the court considered the issue of whether the phrase "unfair compe-
tition," as it appeared in a comprehensive general liability insurance policy under the definition
of advertising injury, was restricted to the common law tort definition of unfair competition or
whether it included statutory definitions of unfair competition which embrace all unlawful,
unfair or fraudulent business practices. Bank of the West, 226 Cal. App. 3d at 844-46, 277
Cal. Rptr. at 223-27. The court held that "unfair competition" as used in standard form Com-
prehensive General Liability Coverage (CGL) policies includes "coverage for all unlawful and
unfair business practices committed against either a business rival and/or the general public."
Id. at 840, 277 Cal. Rptr. at 220; see also Keating v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 754 F.
Supp. 1431 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (holding that "unfair competition" within meaning of policy's
advertising injury coverage included unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practices). In
Keating, the district court interpreted the phrase "unfair competition" as it appeared in a
comprehensive general liability insurance policy defining advertising injury. The plaintiffs al-
leged that the defendants perpetrated a scheme whereby corporate bonds were backed by the
full faith and credit of the United States Government although, in fact, they were not. Id. at
1433-34. In considering whether the defendant's alleged conduct constituted an advertising
injury within the terms of the insurance policy, the court held that the term unfair competi-
tion, "as used in the primary policies, means unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business practices
and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising." Id. at 1437; see, e.g., CAL. Bus. &
PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 1987) ("[Ulnfair competition shall mean and include all unlawful,
unfair or fraudulent business practices."); see also id. §§ 17000-17100 (West 1989 & Supp.
1991) (California's unfair trade practices statute).
8. See, eg., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1780(a)(4) (West Supp. 1991) (providing for recovery of
punitive damages for actions arising under Act); Davis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, 906 F.2d 1206, 1223 n.20 (8th Cir. 1990) (punitive damages not available for violations
of Section 10(b) of Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Bowden v. Robinson, 67 Cal. App. 3d
705, 714, 136 Cal. Rptr. 871, 878 (1977) (punitive damages not available under anti-fraud
provisions of California Corporate Securities Act). Punitive damages may be available for
securities violations when the basis for recovery is a common law theory such as fraud. See
CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294 (West 1991) (punitive damages may be recovered in non-contract
actions when malice proven); Bowden, 67 Cal. App. 3d 705, 714, 136 Cal. Rptr. 871, 878
(recognizing punitive damages available to those alleging common law fraud).
9. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1780 (West 1985 & Supp. 1991). The attorney's fees provision is
housed in § 1780(5)(d) of the Act and states in pertinent part: "The court shall award court
costs and attorney's fees to a prevailing plaintiff in litigation filed pursuant to this section.
Reasonable attorney's fees may be awarded to a prevailing defendant upon a finding by the
court that the plaintiff's prosecution of the action was not in good faith." Id. § 1780(5)(d).
10. See infra notes 106, 142.
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creative plaintiffs' attorneys to assert securities related claims under the
Act. The propriety of suing under the Act for securities violations must
be questioned in light of the statutes' consumer emphasis. I I To resolve
whether investment securities were intended to come within the purview
of the Act, this Article analyzes the language of the Act and the body of
out-of-state case law that has addressed the issue. 12 This Article con-
cludes that investment securities were not intended to come within the
scope of California's consumer protection statute.
II. SCOPE OF THE ACT
A. Purposes Underlying the Act
The starting point for construing the scope of the Act and determin-
ing its purposes is the Act's legislative history. The legislative history
does not specifically address whether investment securities fall within the
ambit of the Act. It does, however, record the climate within which the
Act was passed,1 3 which sheds some light on whether the legislature in-
tended to permit recovery for securities fraud under the Act.
The legislative history of the Act reveals that it was passed in re-
sponse to heightened consumer awareness, the corresponding develop-
ment of consumers as an interest group, and to protect unsophisticated,
uneducated and low income consumers.
14
[The Act] represents an extended and thorough effort to arrive
at legislation which will give consumers in this state much
needed remedies against deceptive practices in the market-
place....
The Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disorders found unethical and deceptive practices of merchants
in low income areas to be factors contributing to the distur-
bances in our cities in recent years .... It is my opinion and
desire that legislation of this type will have a substantial deter-
rent effect as to the deceptive practices it makes unlawful."5
11. See infra notes 26-141 and accompanying text.
12. Id.
13. Reed, supra note 1, at 6-7.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 7 n.21 (quoting James A. Hayes, Assembly Judiciary Committee, May 25, 1970);
see also id. at 5-6 (citing REPORT OF NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISOR-
DERS 274-75 (1968)). A commission led by then-Illinois Governor Otto Kerner found that
"much of the violence in recent urban disorders was directed at stores and other commercial
establishments in disadvantaged neighborhoods. Rioters seemed to focus on stores operated
by merchants who, they believed, had been charging exorbitant prices or selling inferior
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One interpretation of this passage is that the Act was written to aid par-
ticularly unsophisticated, low-income consumers-those most likely to
be taken advantage of by merchants-not consumers who have money to
invest.
At least two courts have argued that investors are distinct from or-
dinary consumers because investors are generally more sophisticated.16
In In re Catanella,17 the plaintiffs sued the defendants for mishandling
their investment portfolios. The plaintiffs' complaint included allega-
tions under New Jersey's consumer fraud statute,18 but the court de-
clined to hold that investment securities came within its ambit:
[T]here is a distinction, although subtle, between the policies
underlying the protection of consumers in general and the pro-
tection of investors in particular. . . . Not all investors are
savvy, sophisticated financial moguls. Nor are they the poor,
uneducated, naive consumers the Consumer Fraud Act was
designed to protect.... Securities fraud is qualitatively differ-
ent from the archetypical installment credit sale scam where
the uneducated are duped into buying inferior consumer goods
at exorbitant prices. The rationale behind the Consumer Fraud
Act is inapposite in the securities area.19
As Catanella illustrates, there may be a difference between uneducated,
low-income consumers and the typical securities investor. Accordingly,
statutory protections afforded investors may be qualitatively different
from those afforded low-income consumers. If this distinction is correct,
then the protections and procedures granted under the Act should not be
applied to investors, and the legislature probably did not intend for the
Act to apply to investors.
The logic of this theory is easily challenged. It suggests that persons
most often forced to resort to the redress of state and federal securities
laws are sophisticated or semi-sophisticated investors. This is not always
true. An elderly, uneducated widow defrauded of her life savings
through an investment scam may be just as naive as an uneducated con-
goods .... IT]he Commission concluded that 'exploitive practices flourish .... ' " Id. at 5-6
(citing REPORT OF NATIONAL ADVISORY CoMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 275 (1968)).
16. Morris v. Gilbert, 649 F. Supp. 1491, 1497 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); In re Cantanella, 583 F.
Supp. 1388, 1443-44 (E.D. Pa. 1984). Morris is discussed infra notes 74-78 and accompanying
text.
17. 583 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
18. New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-1 to :8-48 (West 1989 &
Supp. 1991).
19. Catanella, 583 F. Supp. at 1443-44 (citations omitted) (citing Kugler v. Romain, 279
A.2d 640, 648-49 (1971)).
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sumer duped into buying goods at exorbitant prices and, in some in-
stances, may be an even more pathetic subject. Although the distinction
between sophisticated investors and low-income consumers has some
merit, it alone is insufficient to support a conclusion that investment se-
curities are outside the scope of the Act.
B. Liberal Construction Provisions and Express Purposes
The Consumers Legal Remedies Act sets forth its'underlying pur-
poses and commands that these purposes be liberally construed.20 Sec-
tion 1760 states, in pertinent part: "This title shall be liberally construed
and applied to promote its underlying purposes, which are to protect
consumers against unfair and deceptive business practices and to provide
efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection. 2 1 The
first phrase of section 1760 provides two relevant instructions as to the
Act's intended scope. First, the language instructs that the Act be "liber-
ally construed.., to promote its underlying purposes."'2 2 The "liberal
construction" language implies that more causes of action, rather than
fewer, should come within the scope of the Act.23  The subsequent
phrase, "applied to promote its underlying purposes," limits this direc-
tion.24 The plain directive of the statute is that the Act be liberally con-
strued to the extent that such a construction will promote the Act's
underlying purposes of protecting consumers from unfair trade practices.
Thus, both the legislative history and the Act's stated purposes suggest
that to determine whether investment securities are within the Act's
scope requires an analysis of whether purchasers of investment securities
are "consumers" within the meaning of the Act.25
20. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1760 (West 1985).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Leroy T. v. Workmen's Compensation Appeals Bd., 12 Cal. 3d 434,438, 525 P.2d 665,
666-67, 115 Cal. Rptr. 761, 762-63 (1974) (where statutory language plain and clear courts
must enforce it as written); Estate of Richartz, 45 Cal. 2d 292, 294, 288 P.2d 857, 858 (1955)
(courts must construe language in statute according to its ordinary plain meaning unless other-
wise clearly indicated); Wilson v. County of Santa Clara, 68 Cal. App. 3d 78, 83-84, 137 Cal.
Rptr. 78, 80-81 (1977) (liberal construction requires broad interpretation).
24. Mulville v. San Diego, 183 Cal. 734, 739, 192 P. 702, 704 (1920) (liberal construction
of statute does not mean enlargement of its plain provisions); Neeley v. Board of Retirement,
36 Cal. App. 3d 815, 822, 111 Cal. Rptr. 841, 846 (1974) ("[R]ule of liberal construction is
applied for the purpose of effectuating the obvious legislative intent and should not blindly be
followed so as to eradicate the clear language and purpose of the statute.. . ." (citation omit-
ted)); Beatty v. Hughes, 61 Cal. App. 2d 489, 491-92, 143 P.2d 110, 111 (1944) (even when
liberal construction of statute demanded, courts must be restrained by clear language of
statute).
25. See Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act-Consumer Protection Act, TEx. Bus. &
November 1991]
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III. DISCERNING THE BOUNDARIES OF CONSUMERS,
GOODS AND SERVICES
The Consumers Legal Remedies Act defines a consumer as "an indi-
vidual who seeks or acquires, by purchase or lease, any goods or services
for personal, family, or household purposes. ' 26 According to this defini-
tion, whether purchasers of investment securities are consumers turns on
whether investment securities constitute consumer goods or services
within the meaning of the Act. Several sources aid in discerning the
boundaries of the Act's definitions of goods and services: provisions
within the Act itself, California case law, other California statutory
schemes and out-of-state case law and statutes.
A. Goods and Tangible Chattels
Section 1761(a) of the Act defines goods as tangible chattels, but it
does not define tangible chattels. 27 No California case decided to date
has interpreted the scope of the goods definition under section 1761(a).
28
COM. CODE ANN. § .50 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991). Texas' consumer protection statute is
similar to California's; both statutes couch recovery in terms of consumers, goods and services.
See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1761, 1780 (West 1985 & Supp. 1991); TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. §§ 17.45, .50 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991). The Texas statute provides that any consumer
who has been the victim of a deceptive trade practice is entitled to recovery. Id. § 17.50. A
consumer is defined as "an individual, partnership, corporation, this state, or a subdivision or
agency of this state who seeks or acquires by purchase or lease, any goods or services." Id.
§ 17.45(4). Goods are defined as "tangible chattels or real property purchased or leased for
use." Id. § 17.45(1). Generally, Texas courts construing their consumer statute have analyzed
the issue of whether a plaintiff's claim falls within the statute by determining whether the
plaintiff was: (1) a consumer as defined in the statute; and (2) whether the alleged good or
service was, in fact, a good or service. See Knight v. International Harvester Credit Corp., 627
S.W.2d 382, 389 (Tex. 1982); Irizarry v. Amarillo Pantex Fed. Credit Union, 695 S.W.2d 91,
92 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985); Portland Say. & Loan Ass'n v. BeviU, Bresler & Schulman Gov't Sec.,
619 S.W.2d 241, 245 (Tex. Civ. App. 1981); see also Bowyer v. Beardon, 291 S.W. 219, 222-23
(Tex. 1927) (chattels is "a very comprehensive term... including every species of property
which is not real estate or a freehold"); Parr v. Tagco Indus., 620 S.W.2d 200, 205-06 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1981) (presumption is legislature used term chattels in its "settled judicial sense");
United Postage Corp. v. Kammeyer, 581 S.W.2d 716, 721 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) ("items of
personal property which may be seen, weighed, measured, felt or touched"). The California
Act also lends itself to this analysis.
26. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1761(d) (West Supp. 1991).
27. Id. § 1761(a) (West 1988 & Supp. 1991).
(a) "Goods" means tangible chattels bought or leased for use primarily for personal,
family, or household purposes, including certificates or coupons exchangeable for
such goods, and including goods which, at the time of the sale or subsequently, are to
be so affixed to real property as to become a part of such real property, whether or
not severable therefrom.
Id.
28. No California case has addressed the scope of the definition of tangible chattels in the
consumer context. Section 6016 of the California Revenue and Taxation Code defines tangible
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Black's Law Dictionary defines chattel as "[a]n article of personal prop-
erty, as opposed to real property. A thing personal and movable. It may
refer to animate as well as inanimate property."2 9 Black's also defines
tangible as "[h]aving or possessing physical form. Capable of being
touched and seen; perceptible to the touch; tactile; palpable; capable of
being possessed or realized; readily apprehensible by the mind; real; sub-
stantial.""0 However, Black's defines intangibles as "[p]roperty that is a
'right' rather than a physical object. Examples would be patents, stocks,
bonds, goodwill, trademarks, franchises and copyrights."31 Accordingly,
the plain meaning of the term tangible chattels suggests that the Act
should not be construed to include investment securities.
personal property as "personal property which may be seen, weighed, measured, felt, or
touched, or which is in any other manner perceptible to the senses." CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE
§ 6016 (West 1987); see Capital Records, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 158 Cal. App. 3d
582, 596, 204 Cal. Rptr. 802, 810 (1984) (upholding use tax for original master tapes acquired
by film company on grounds that tapes were tangible personal property); see also Simplicity
Pattern Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 27 Cal. 3d 900, 912, 615 P.2d 555, 562, 167 Cal. Rptr.
366, 373 (1980) (allowing sales tax on transfer of film negatives on grounds that negatives were
personal property even though they were valued for intellectual content). For cases generally
construing personal property see In re Dodge's Estate, 6 Cal. 3d 311, 491 P.2d 385, 98 Cal.
Rptr. 801 (1971) (holding that phrase "personal property" in will was inherently ambiguous
where decedent's property consisted of note and trust deeds); In re Borrero's Estate, 125 Cal.
App. 153, 13 P.2d 1017 (1932) (holding corporate stock to be personal property); see also CAL.
CIV. CODE § 663 (West 1982) (defining personal property as "[elvery kind of property that is
not real [property]").
29. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 215 (5th ed. 1979). Black's Law Dictionary does not
define animate or inanimate. Webster's has defined animate as "alive" and inanimate as "not
endowed with life or spirit." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 85,
1140 (1976). Inanimate should not be confused with intangible.
30. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 29, at 1305. Black's also defines goods, con-
sumer goods and consumer product. Consumer goods are defined as "[g]oods which are used
or bought for use primarily for personal, family or household purposes." Id. at 287. Con-
sumer product is similarly defined as "[a]ny tangible personal property which is distributed in
commerce and which is normally used for personal, family, or household purposes (including
any such property intended to be attached to or installed in any real property without regard
to whether it is so attached or installed)." Id. A "consumer" is defined as:
One who consumes. Individuals who purchase, use, maintain, and dispose of prod-
ucts and services.... A member of that broad class of people who are affected by
pricing policies, financing practices, quality of goods and services, credit reporting,
debt collection, and other trade practices for which state and federal consumer pro-
tection laws are enacted.
Id. at 286.
31. Id. at 726. Courts within the Fifth Circuit have held that investment securities do not
come within Texas' Deceptive Trade Practices Act on the grounds that they are not tangible
chattel. Swenson v. Engelstad, 626 F.2d 421, 428 (5th Cir. 1980) (stock certificates not
"goods" or "tangible chattels" within meaning of Texas' Deceptive Trade Practices Act-Con-
sumer Protection Act because they were evidence of incorporeal rights); Cowen v. First Nat'l
Bank of Brownsville, 63 S.W. 532, 533 (Tex. 1901) (certificates of deposits are evidence of
incorporeal rights and thus not goods or chattel).
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Whenever the California State Legislature has intended to include
intangible chattels in a definition of personal property, it has specifically
done so. 2 Consider California's attachment statutes. 33 Although Cali-
fornia's attachment statutes do not define consumer goods, they do define
personal property and tangible property.34 Section 481.225 of the Cali-
fornia Code of Civil Procedure defines tangible personal property as in-
cluding "chattel paper... securities, and money."' 35 Section 481.175
defines personal property as "both tangible and intangible personal prop-
erty.",36 Notably, securities are personal property under the attachment
statutes. These sections indicate that the legislature, had it intended to
include intangible chattel or securities within the Act, could have ex-
pressly done so. However, the definitions of goods may vary from statute
to statute. According to Black's, goods is "[a] term of variable content
and meaning. It may include every species of personal property or it
may be given a very restricted meaning. ,37 Thus, the use of the word
tangible in the Act must be construed as a limitation on the chattel defi-
nition in the Act. 8
California's Commercial Code, however, could support a contrary
argument.39 Section 2105 of the California Commercial Code defines
goods as "all things... which are movable at the time of identification to
the contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be
paid, investment securities... and things in action." Thus, when the
California State Legislature has intended to exclude investment securities
from a statutory scheme it has done so. Ultimately, however, because of
the variable meanings of the word "goods," analogies to other California
statutory schemes provide little guidance in determining whether the
32. See, eg., CAL. COM. CODE § 9106 (West 1990) ("general intagibles" means any per-
sonal property).
33. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 481.010-493.050 (West 1979 & Supp. 1991).
34. Id. §§ 481.175-.225.
35. Id. § 481.225.
36. Id. § 481.175.
37. BLACK'S LAW DICTIoNARY, supra note 29, at 694.
38. Under the statutory construction rule of noscitur a socils, doubt as to the meaning of a
word may be removed by reference to the words it is associated with. Fox v. Hale & Norcross
Silver Mining Co., 108 Cal. 369, 426,41 P. 308, 326 (1895). Other California statutes similarly
define goods. See CAL.,Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17538(d)(1) (West Supp. 1991) (goods defined
as "tangible chattels, including certificates or coupons exchangeable for such goods"); see also
id. § 17504(c) (West 1991) (defining consumer good as "any article which is used or bought for
use primarily for personal, family or household purposes"); cf. id. § 17024 (West 1987) ("arti-
cles" and "products" under Unfair Trade Practices Act include "any article, product, com-
modity, thing of value, service or output of a service trade").
39. CAL. COM. CODE § 2105 (West 1964 & Supp. 1991).
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term "goods" was intended to include investment securities under the
Act.
1. Certificates or coupons
Although other California statutory schemes do not provide much
guidance in deciphering whether investment securities are tangible chat-
tel under the Act, other provisions of the Act do provide guidance. The
plain language of the Act's "goods" definition suggests that it does not
encompass investment securities.4 Section 1761(a) of the California
Civil Code includes as goods "certificates or coupons exchangeable for
such goods."41 Obviously, investment securities are not redeemable for
goods and therefore do not explicitly fall within this definition. Never-
theless, investment securities take a similar form since they are usually
embodied by certificates. The inclusion of the phrase "certificates or cou-
pons" suggests that the legislature was mindful that certificates or cou-
pons might not be construed as tangible chattel. Inclusion of the
"certificates or coupons" language suggests that investment securities
could also have been specifically included, had the legislature intended
them to be included within the Act's definition of tangible chattel.
2. Notice and demand sections
The notice and demand provisions of the Act also suggest that in-
vestment securities were not intended to constitute goods under the
Act.42 These sections imply that an investment security is not a con-
40. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1761(a) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991). Section 1761(a) defines the
term "goods":
[Tangible chattels bought or leased for use primarily for personal, family, or house-
hold purposes, including certificates or coupons exchangeable for such goods, and
including goods which, at the time of the sale or subsequently, are to be so affixed to
real property as to become a part of such real property, whether or not severable
therefrom.
Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. §§ 1782, 1784 (West 1985). Section 1782 of the Act states:
(a) Thirty days or more prior to the commencement of an action for damages pursu-
ant to the provisions of this title, the consumer shall do the following:
(2) Demand that such person correct, repair, replace or otherwise rectify the goods
or services alleged to be in violation of Section 1770.
(c) No action for damages may be maintained under the provisions of Section 1781
upon a showing by a person alleged to have employed or committed methods, acts or
practices declared unlawful by Section 1770 that all of the following exist:
(2) All consumers so identified have been notified that upon their request such per-
son shall make the appropriate correction, repair, replacement or other renedy of the
goods and services.
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sumer good as that term is commonly employed or understood.43 Unlike
an automobile or an appliance, an investment security is not bought "for
use," and does not carry with it an implied warranty of merchantability.
Furthermore, there is no objective standard for determining whether a
security is "defective" under the above sections. 4 An investment secur-
ity is not capable of being "corrected," "repaired" or "replaced" by the
seller upon notice from the buyer pursuant to these sections.45 Because
application of these provisions of the Act to investment securities would
be impossible, it is unlikely that investment securities were intended by
the legislature to constitute goods under the Act.
3. California case law
Because the Act is silent on whether investment securities are goods,
the next step is to examine case law to determine whether the courts have
interpreted the statute to include investment securities. Unfortunately,
no California court has addressed the question of whether the Act's defi-
nition of goods includes investment securities.46 Most of the California
appellate court decisions interpreting the Act have involved typical con-
sumer goods.47
(3) The correction, repair, replacement or other remedy requested by such consum-
ers has been, or, in a reasonable time, shall be, given.
Id. § 1782. Similarly, § 1784 states in pertinent part:
No award of damages may be given in any action based on a method, act, or practice
declared to be unlawful by Section 1770 if the person alleged to have employed or
committed such method, act, or practice ... (b) makes an appropriate correction,
repair or replacement or other remedy of the goods and services.
Id. § 1784.
43. Id. §§ 1782, 1784.
44. See id.
45. See id. § 1782(c)(3).
46. See Kagan v. Gibraltar Say. & Loan Ass'n, 35 Cal. 3d 582, 676 P.2d 1060, 200 Cal.
Rptr. 38 (1984) (plaintiffs-customers sued defendants for misleading and false advertising for
illegally charging fees on individual retirement accounts); Schneider v. Vennard, 183 Cal. App.
3d 1340, 228 Cal. Rptr. 800 (1986) (plaintiffs-class/shareholders sued defendants for securities
violations and sought to use Act's class action certification procedures; plaintiffs-class did not
allege substantive violations under Act; hence, issue of whether Act applied to securities never
reached).
47. See, e-g., Clemons v. Western Photos Camera Hut, 117 Cal. App. 3d 392, 172 Cal.
Rptr. 782 (1981) (rolls of film); Hogya v. Superior Court, 75 Cal. App. 3d 122, 142 Cal. Rptr.
325 (1977) (upgraded beef); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Superior Court, 52 Cal. App. 3d 149,
124 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1975) (off-road motor vehicles). These decisions imply that securities
should be excluded from the statutory definition of consumer goods. See also Committee on
Children's Television v. General Foods, 35 Cal. 3d 197, 673 P.2d 660, 197 Cal. Rptr. 783
(1983) (breakfast cereal); Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 858, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal.
Rptr. 796 (1971) (freezers); Peterson v. Superior Court, 177 Cal. App. 3d 54, 222 Cal. Rptr.
709 (1986) (airline discount coupons). For a comprehensive article on the scope of state con-
sumer fraud statutes and a review of typical applications, see Donald M. Zupanec, Annotation,
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Analogous cases may shed some light on the issue. In Civil Service
Employees Co. v. Superior Court,a" the plaintiffs brought a class action
lawsuit against an insurance company for its refusal to pay benefits alleg-
edly owed the members of the class.a9 The court held that the Act's class
action procedures were applicable in all actions."0 In this regard, the
court stated that the Act "does not directly apply to the present case
because insurance is not technically either a 'good' or a 'service' within
the meaning of the Act."
'51
Investment securities may be compared to insurance policies be-
cause the two instruments are similar in several ways. Neither insurance
nor investment securities are tangible, movable or capable of being seen.
Both insurance and investment securities represent intangible rights em-
bodied by policies and certificates. The physical representations of such
intangible rights should not be confused with the rights themselves which
are unmovable, invisible, untouchable and intangible. Thus, if insurance
policies are excluded from the Act, investment securities should be ex-
cluded as well.
Although two California appellate decisions have addressed claims
under the Act for damages arising out of the sale of individual retirement
accounts, neither expressly or implicitly addressed the issue of the Act's
coverage of investment securities.52 In one of the cases, Kagan v. Gibral-
tar Savings & Loan Ass'n '5 the plaintiff, a holder of an Individual Retire-
ment Account (IRA), sued the financial institution holding the account.
The plaintiff sued under the Act alleging that the institution falsely ad-
vertised that its customers would not be charged management fees on
their IRAs." The court did not directly address the issue of whether the
sale of IRAs to a bank customer constituted consumer "goods" or "serv-
ices" under the Act.5  However, even if these accounts had been con-
strued as consumer goods within the scope of the Act, IRAs are not
Practices Forbidden By State Deceptive Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Acts, 89
A.L.R. 3d 449 (1979 & Supp. 1990); Donald M. Zupanec, Annotation, Scope and Exemptions
of State Deceptive Trade Practice and Consumer Protection Acts, 89 A.L.R. 3d 399 (1979 &
Supp. 1990).
48. 22 Cal. 3d 362, 372, 584 P.2d 497, 512, 149 Cal. Rptr. 360, 375 (1978).
49. Id. at 365, 584 P.2d at 498, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 361.
50. Id. at 376, 584 P.2d at 505, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 368.
51. Id.
52. Kagan, 35 Cal. 3d 582, 676 P.2d 1060, 200 Cal. Rptr. 30; Dean Witter Reynolds v.
Superior Court, 211 Cal. App. 3d 758, 259 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1989).
53. 35 Cal. 3d 582, 676 P.2d 1060, 200 Cal. Rptr. 38 (1984).
54. Id.
55. Id.; see also Dean Witter Reynolds, 211 Cal. App. 3d 758, 762-63, 259 Cal. Rptr. 789,
791. Like Kagan, Dean Witter involved allegations that the defendant-financial institution
illegally charged fees in connection with IRA accounts. Id. As in Kagan, the court did not
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investment securities.5 6
4. Case law in jurisdictions outside California
Lacking a specific direction from either the California legislature or
courts, decisions from courts of other states may prove instructive. The
question of whether consumer goods or services includes investment se-
curities has been addressed many times in Texas. Texas' consumer pro-
tection statute is similar to California's, in that both statutes restrict
recovery to consumers, goods and services.5 7 In Portland Savings &
Loan Ass'n v. Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Government Securities,58 the
plaintiff sued a stockbroker for a misrepresentation made during the sale
of securities. 9 The Texas Court of Civil Appeals construed goods "of-
fered, directly or indirectly to the public for sale" to exclude investment
securities." Similarly, in Allais v. Donaldson, Lu/kin & Jenrette,"' plain-
tiffs also sued their stockbroker for misrepresentations made in connec-
tion with the sale of securities.62 In construing the same statute, the
court also held that "a sale of securities is not a sale of goods."63
The definitions of tangible chattel, the notice and repair language of
the Act, the dearth of securities cases brought under the Act in Califor-
nia, and other jurisdictions' interpretations strongly suggest that the
Act's consumer goods provision was not intended to include investment
securities-even under the statute's liberal construction directive.
B. Services
Although it is unlikely that investment securities could be construed
implicitly or explicitly address the issue of whether securities were goods or services under the
Act.
56. Section 25019 of the California Corporations Code defines "security":
[A]ny note; stock; treasury stock; membership in an incorporated or unincorporated
association; bond; debenture; evidence of indebtedness; certificate of interest or par-
ticipation in any profit-sharing agreement; collateral trust certificate ... put, call,
straddle, option or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit... or, in general,
any interest or instrument commonly know as a "security."
CAL. CORP. CODE § 25019 (West Supp. 1991). In comparison, IRAs are trusts, held by banks,
that afford their owners certain federal tax benefits and, generally, preferred interest rates. See
26 U.S.C. § 408(a) (1988).
57. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750-1784 (West 1985); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50
(,West 1987 & Supp. 1991).
58. 619 S.W.2d 241, 245 (rex. Civ. App. 1981).
59. Id. at 243.
60. Id. at 245.
61. 532 F. Supp. 749, 750 (S.D. Tex. 1981).
62. Id.
63. Id.; see also Swenson, 626 F.2d at 428 (stock certificates not goods or tangible chattel
under Texas' Deceptive Trade Practices Act).
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as goods under the Act, they may be construed as services." The defini-
tion of services appears facially broad enough to include investment se-
curities. Services are defined in section 1761(b) as "work, labor, and
services for other than a commercial or business use, including services
furnished in connection with the sale or repair of goods."65 Because this
broad definition of services must be interpreted in light of the Act's un-
derlying purposes and intent-to protect consumers from unfair and de-
ceptive business practices66-- its scope should be limited to consumer-
related services. No California appellate court has addressed the ques-
tion of whether the act of selling investment securities constitutes a con-
sumer service under the Act.67 In an effort to resolve this issue, this
Article analyzes the decisions of other jurisdictions.
1. Professional versus consumer-related services
One court that addressed the issue of whether services included in-
vestment securities under a consumer fraud statute was In re Catanella.65
The court in Cantanella distinguished consumer services from the profes-
sional or semi-professional services provided by brokerage firms. The
precise issue in Catanella was whether New Jersey's Consumer Fraud
Statute's "merchandise" prerequisite was broad enough to include securi-
ties transactions. Noting that the term merchandise meant "goods... or
services," the court concentrated its analysis on the services prong of the
definition.69 The court drew a sharp distinction between professional or
semi-professional services and consumer services,70 holding that the sale
64. At first blush, an argument that investment securities are somehow "services" appears
awkward. As several Texas courts have noted, however, inherent in the sale of every good are
incidental services. In the case of securities, the incidental services would be the broker's act of
buying the securities at the investor's request or the advice given to the investor in connection
with the trade. See infra notes 84-98 and accompanying text. An argument that securities are
services under the Act would turn on whether or not a broker's services were, in fact, con-
sumer services.
65. CAL, CIV. CODE § 1761(b) (West Supp. 1991).
66. Id. § 1760 (West 1985 & Supp. 1991).
67. One California court has suggested that the Act does not apply when a bank provides
property tax payment services to customers. Altman v. Manhattan Say. Bank, 83 Cal. App. 3d
761, 770, 148 Cal. Rptr. 100, 105 (1978). In Altman, the action was brought by a plaintiff-
class against a bank for the bank's alleged failure to make a timely property tax payment on
behalf of the plaintiff-class. Id. at 764, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 101. Although the court did not
squarely address the issue, the court noted that under the Altman facts, the Act would not
apply. Id. at 770, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 105.
68. 583 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
69. Id. at 1441-43.
70. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-1 to -20 (West 1989). New Jersey's consumer fraud statute
provides consumers with a private remedy for consumer fraud. The statute states in pertinent
part: "The act, use or employment by any person of any unconscionable commercial practice,
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of investment securities was not within New Jersey's consumer fraud
statute.71 The court relied heavily on the reasoning of a New Jersey deci-
sion, Neveroski v. Blair,72 which held that real estate brokerage services
were semi-professional services and therefore did not fall within the
scope of its consumer fraud statutes:
Certainly no one would argue that a member of any of the
learned professions is subject to the provisions of the Consumer
Fraud Act despite the fact that he renders "services" to the
public. And although the literal language may be construed to
include professional services, it would be ludicrous to construe
the legislation with that broad a sweep in view of the fact that
the nature of the services does not fall into the category of
consumerism.
73
deception, fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation ... in connection with the
sale or advertisement of any merchandise... is declared to be an unlawful practice .... ." N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2 (West 1989). The Act provides for recovery of attorney's fees, treble
damages, filing fees and reasonable costs. Id. § 56:8-19.
71. Catanella, 583 F. Supp. at 1443. Catanella only addressed whether the sale of invest-
ment securities constituted a consumer service under the New Jersey statute. There is a dis-
tinction between the service that an investment securities broker renders when he or she
merely sells securities to investors and other types of investment securities services such as
investment counseling and tax advice. See infra notes 91-98 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Texas cases that have developed this distinction.
72. 358 A.2d 473, 479 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1976) (superseded by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2
(West 1989)). At least one court has declined to follow Neveroski in the real estate context
following amendments to the New Jersey's Consumer Fraud Act. See Arroyo v. Arnold-
Baker & Assocs., Inc., 502 A.2d 106 (N.J. 1985) (holding real estate brokers subject to New
Jersey's Consumer Fraud Act). Catanella is not the only court, however, to find the reasoning
in Neveroski persuasive. See, eg., Stella v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 574 A.2d 468 (N.J.
1990) (securities fraud not within scope of New Jersey's Consumer Fraud Act).
73. Catanella, 583 F. Supp. at 1443 (quoting Neveroski v. Blair, 358 A.2d 473, 481 (N.J.
Super. Ct. 1976)). Quoting Neveroski, the court in Catanella reasoned:
A real estate broker is in a far different category from the purveyors of products or
services or other activities. He is in a semi-professional status subject to testing, li-
censing, regulations and penalties through other legislative provisions .... Although
not on the same plane as other professionals such as lawyers, physicians, dentists ...
the nature of his activity is recognized as something beyond the ordinary commercial
seller of goods or services-an activity beyond the pale of the act under
consideration.
Id. at 1443 (quoting Neveroski v. Blair, 358 A.2d 473, 480-81 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1976)).
In excluding brokerage services, the court in Catanella was mindful of the fact that the
definition of "services," as here, was "facially broad enough to cover securities." Id. at 1442.
Nevertheless, it reasoned that " 'the entire thrust of the Consumer Fraud Act [was] pointed to
products and services sold to consumers in the popular sense,'" id. (quoting Neveroski v.
Blair, 358 A.2d 473, 480 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1976)), and that the reach of the act Would otherwise
"seem limitless," id. Relying again on Neveroski, the court reasoned that a literal construc-
tion of the term "services" would produce absurd results not intended by the legislature. Id. at
1443 (quoting Neveroski v. Blair, 358 A.2d 473, 480-81 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1976)); see also Lind-
ner v. Durham Hosiery Mills, Inc., 761 F.2d 162, 165 (4th Cir. 1985) (quoting ITCO Corp. v.
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The Morris v. Gilbert74 court also decided that investment securities
services were fundamentally different from other types of services. In
Morris the court interpreted the breadth of New York's consumer fraud
statute which provides consumers with a private remedy for the redress
of consumer fraud.7" The plaintiff sued the defendant for state and fed-
eral securities violations in addition to violations of New York's Con-
sumer Protection Statute.76 The court vacillated on the issue of whether
or not the defendant's alleged misrepresentations made to the plaintiff
were intended to come within the statute." The court reasoned:
[S]ales of securities are not so obviously outside the scope of the
[statute], because.., the buyer is often less sophisticated than
the seller.... On the other hand, people do not generally buy
securities in the same way that they buy an automobile, a televi-
sion set, or the myriad of consumer goods found in supermar-
kets. For one thing, securities are purchased as investments,
not as goods to be 'consumed' or 'used'. 78
As the courts in Catanella and Morris found, there is a valid distinc-
tion between investment services and consumer services.' 9 Unlike most
sellers of consumer merchandise, securities brokers must take an exami-
nation and obtain certification by the State of California. s° They are
subject to strict regulation, licensing, testing and penalties. 8 The Com-
missioner of Corporations is charged with the oversight and enforcement
of the licensing provisions.82 These regulations suggest that California
views securities brokers as professionals. If securities brokers are profes-
sionals, then the services they render should not be covered by the Act
Michelin Tire Corp., 722 F.2d 42, 48 n.10 (4th Cir. 1983)) (construing North Carolina's con-
sumer protection statute to exclude securities brokerage services, reasoning among other
things, that while the "'prohibitory scope of the [statute] ... is potentially quite broad'...
[t]he apparent purpose behind the enactment of [the statute] was the protection of the consum-
ing public").
74. 649 F. Supp. 1491 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
75. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 349(h) (McKinney 1988). Subsection 349(a) describes what
acts trigger the remedies: "Deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any business, trade or
commerce or in the furnishing of any service... are hereby declared unlawful." Id. § 349(a).
76. Morris, 649 F. Supp. at 1491.
77. Id. at 1497.
78. Id. The court dismissed the consumer fraud allegations. Id.
79. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
80. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25210-25211 (West 1977 & Supp. 1991).
81. See id. §§ 25210-25540 (securities licensing, certification, censure, suspension, revoca-
tion, penalty, standards, training, experience and qualifications provisions of the California
Corporations Code).
82. See id. §§ 25530-25532 (West 1991).
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because the Act applies to consumer services.83
2. "Incidental" versus "objective of transaction" services
Texas courts have provided the most case law on the issue of
whether services include brokerage services under a consumer fraud stat-
ute. These courts have generally interpreted investment securities serv-
ices to fall outside the scope of their Deceptive Trade Practices Act
(DTPA).8 4 Recently, in E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Youngblood,85 an investor
sued a brokerage firm under the DTPA to recover for improper invest-
ment and tax advice.86 The plaintiffs were told that no taxable conse-
quences would occur if they withdrew their funds from their stock
purchase plan and reinvested them.87 The defendant brokers then sold
the plaintiffs shares in investment vehicles.88 The appellate court deter-
mined that "a brokerage firm may be held liable under the Deceptive
Trade Practices Act... for erroneous tax and investment advice when it
is coupled with other services."89 The court stated:
The services of tax and investment counseling and assisting in
the purchase of securities were inextricably intertwined. Ap-
pellees sought and received from appellant expert tax and in-
vestment counseling as to the taxable consequences of the
transaction, without which the sale of securities would not have
been made. We find that appellees were consumers of a service
purchased from appellant. 90
83. See supra notes 1-5 and accompanying text.
84. Texds Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. §§ 17.41-.826 (West 1987 & Supp. 1991).
85. E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Youngblood (Youngblood 1), 708 S.W.2d 865 (Tex. Ct. App.
1986).
86. Id. at 866.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 868.
90. Id. at 868-89 (citations omitted). The Texas Supreme Court granted review of Young-
blood I in E.F. Hutton v. Youngblood (Youngblood 11), 30 Tex. S. Ct. J. 508, withdrawn, 741
S.W.2d 363 (1987). In Youngblood I, the Texas Supreme Court determined that the services
rendered under the facts of the case were not services within the meaning of Texas' Deceptive
Trade Practices Act. Id. at 510. Youngblood II, however, was reheard and in E.F. Hutton &
Co. v. Youngblood (Youngblood II), 741 S.W.2d 363 (1987), the court affirmed the appellate
court opinion (Youngblood I) and held that the issue of whether investment securities are
services under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act was not preserved on appeal. Id. at
364. Rule 133 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure suggests that since Youngblood III, a
Texas Supreme Court decision, did not attempt to correct Youngblood 1, an appellate court
decision, the Texas Supreme Court agreed with Youngblood L Id.
Similarly, in another Texas case, Frizzell v. Cook, 790 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990), an
investor sued the defendant-brokerage firm under the DTPA for providing her with faulty
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In another case construing the Texas Act, FDIC v. Munn,91 the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit made an important distinction
regarding investment securities services. The court noted that there is a
difference between incidental services relating to the sale of intangibles
on the one hand, and the purchase of services which are purchased as the
object of the transaction on the other hand.92 In Munn, the plaintiffs'
guarantor sued the defendant-lender for services rendered when the
plaintiffs purchased stock in a corporation.93 In determining whether the
plaintiffs were consumers under the DTPA, the Fifth Circuit held that
incidental services rendered in connection with the sale of an intangible
are not covered under Texas' DTPA.94 If, however, the service provided
is the objective of the transaction (as opposed to an incidental service),
then it may be covered.95 The Munn court stated:
"Goods" has a fairly certain meaning under Texas law ....
"Services" has a less certain meaning under Texas law ....
[All] transactions involve human service to some extent, the
cost of which is included in the price of the transaction. Argua-
bly, then, all services in any transaction are purchased "serv-
ices" under the DTPA. Under this approach, any service
involved in a stock purchase or loan transaction would give rise
to DTPA consumer status even though the actual stock
purchase or loan could not, thereby undermining the legisla-
ture's exclusion of sales of intangible chattels from the DTPA.
Thus, ... some activities related to the sale of intangibles must
not be "services" under the DTPA.96
The court's distinction between incidental services and object of the
investment advice and counseling services. Id. at 42. The defendant brokerage firm brought a
partial summary judgment motion on the DTPA allegations, on the grounds that plaintiff
could not sue for securities fraud under the DTPA. Id. at 41-42. The trial court granted the
defendant's partial summary judgment motion. Id. The appellate court reversed, holding that
a plaintiff suing for securities violations is a consumer and may sue under the DTPA for re-
dress. Id. at 47.
91. 804 F.2d 860 (5th Cir. 1986).
92. Id. at 865.
93. Id. at 862.
94. Id. at 865; see also Nottingham v. General Am. Comm., 811 F.2d 873 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 854 (1987). In Nottingham, plaintiffs invested in defendants' investment pro-
gram which included the marketing and sale of videos. Id. Defendants agreed to produce and
distribute videos and to provide legal counsel to the investors if the IRS.challenged the pro-
gram. Id. Plaintiffs sued defendants for securities violations under federal securities laws and
the Texas DTPA. Id. The court held that the legal, production and distribution services
provided were sufficient to bring the action under Texas' DTPA. Id. at 878.
95. Munn, 804 F.2d at 865.
96. Id. at 863-64.
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transaction services is a valid one.97 If claims based on all investment-
related services were permitted under California's Act then, theoreti-
cally, actions could be brought for advice relating to the purchase of
stock, but not for the purchase of the stock itself. Such a construction
would completely usurp the "tangible" chattel directive of the statute.
Therefore, at a minimum, incidental services must not be covered under
the Act. Preferably, no investment-related services should be covered
under the Act for the very reason stated in Munn: drawing the line be-
tween "incidental" advice and "object of the transaction" advice may
prove to be a vague, esoteric and illusory query in light of the tangible
chattel limitation.9" Nevertheless, this distinction by itself is insufficient
to warrant application of the Act to investment securities.
IV. OTHER RATIONALES FOR NOT APPLYING INVESTMENT
SECURITIES TO THE ACT
Courts in other jurisdictions deciding the issue of whether invest-
ment securities should come within their consumer statutes have done so
on numerous grounds.9 9 Many of these reasons apply with equal force to
California's Consumers Legal Remedies Act. Although no rationale by
itself requires the Act to be interpreted as including investment securi-
ties, taken together these rationales suggest that securities should not
come within the Act.
A. Conflicts in Laws and Dual Regulation
The determining factor for most courts deciding that investment se-
curities do not come within consumer protection statutes is that constru-
ing consumer statutes to include investment securities could create
conflicts between those statutes and other regulations. 10 Investment se-
curities are already regulated by both state and federal securities laws. 101
97. See id.
98. See id. at 865.
99. See infra notes 100, 106, 142.
100. Skinner v. Steele, 730 S.W.2d 335, 337 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) (purchasers of annuities
not protected under Tennessee's consumer statute because business of selling annuities not
specifically authorized by state insurance code and purpose of exemption is "intended to avoid
conflict between laws, not to exclude from the Act's coverage every activity that is authorized
or regulated by another statute or agency"); see Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc. v. Hunsucker, 248
S.E.2d 567, 570 (N.C. Ct. App. 1978), reh'g denied, 254 S.E.2d 32 (N.C. 1979) (North Caro-
lina's Unfair Trade Practices Act does not support claim against commodities broker for activ-
ity regulated under Federal Commodities Exchange Act).
101. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988 & Supp. 1989); Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1988 & Supp. 1989); Securities Investor Protec-
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The abundance of remedies available to the securities plaintiff1 2 is a
strong basis for finding that investment securities are not within the
scope of consumer protection statutes.
Some states specifically exempt from their consumer acts actions or
transactions regulated elsewhere. 103 Different consumer statutes employ
different types of exemptions.' 4 One commonly used exemption 05 pro-
vides that actions and transactions which are otherwise regulated are ex-
empted from the act." 6 Many of these exemptions do not define which
tion Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78aaa-78111 (1988); CAL. CORP. CODE § 25000-25706 (West
1977 & Supp. 1991).
102. See infra notes 104, 110.
103. See, eg., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1401-51 to :1406 (West 1991) (exempting ac-
tions or transactions of the Louisiana Public Service Commission or public utility regulating
body); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.86.170 (1989) (exempting actions or transactions by insurance
commissioner or utilities and transportation commissions); see also infra note 106.
104. Louisiana's Unfair Trade Practices Act specifically excludes transactions subject to the
state banking commission. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:1401 to :1406 (West 1991). Courts
construing this statute have held that securities transactions are not within the statute's pur-
view on dual regulation grounds due to the exemption. See Smith v. Cooper, 846 F.2d 325,
328 (5th Cir. 1988) (plaintiffs-shareholders in family business sued defendants-purchasers of
stock in family business for fraud); Moore v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 631 F. Supp. 138, 145
(E.D. La. 1986) (plaintiffs-investors sued defendant-stockbroker and employer for alleged
fraud). The court in Moore stated:
The application of the UTPA [Unfair Trade Practices Act] to these transactions
would produce effects that were not intended, it seems, by the Louisiana legislature.
For example, the director of the Governor's Consumer Protection Division is given
the power to investigate and enforce the UTPA. The application of the UTPA to
securities claims would provide for unintended overlapping investigative and enforce-
ment powers because the state banking commissioner is also authorized to investigate
and enforce laws pertaining to securities under the Blue Sky Law.
An even more bothersome factor to the court is the prospect of subjecting secur-
ities claims to treble damages under the UTPA. Securities transactions have long
been regulated by the state Blue Sky Law. This Court finds that if the legislature
wanted to expose securities violators to the punitive spectra of treble damages, the
Blue Sky statute would have and could have clearly so provided.
Id.
105. An example of a very exhaustive dual regulation exemption exists in Washington. The
Revised Code of Washington § 19.86.170 provides:
Nothing in this chapter shall apply to actions or transactions otherwise permitted,
prohibited or regulated under laws administered by the insurance commissioner of
this state, the Washington utilities and transportation commission, the federal power
commission or actions or transactions permitted by any other regulatory body or
officer acting under statutory authority of this state or the United States.
WASH. REv. CODE § 19.86.170 (1989).
106. Nichols v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 706 F. Supp. 1309, 1337 (M.D.
Tenn. 1989) ("I decline to recommend that the Court extend the remedies available in a securi-
ties fraud action when Congress and the Tennessee legislature have both declined to do so
explicitly."); Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667, 675 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (specific
exemption in Georgia's Fair Business Practice's Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-391 provides that "spe-
cifically" authorized conduct justifies exclusion of claims based upon securities violations);
State v. Piedmont Funding Corp., 382 A.2d 819, 822 (R.I. 1978) (Rhode Island Deceptive
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actions or transactions are otherwise regulated. Courts have used these
"catch-all" exemptions to exclude investment securities. 10 7 Unlike these
jurisdictions, California's Act does not have a dual regulation provision.
Some courts have applied the dual regulation rationale despite the
lack of a specific, dual regulation exemption in their consumer statute. 108
As in California, North Carolina's consumer protection statute does not
have a specific exemption which omits areas "otherwise regulated." 1 9
The court in Lindner v. Durham Hosiery Mills,10 for example, declined
to find that securities transactions came within North Carolina's Unfair
Trade Practices Act, despite the lack of an express exemption omitting
otherwise regulated areas."'
Trade Practices Act exempts activities subject to monitoring by state or federal regulatory
bodies or officers); State ex rel. McLeod v. Rhoades, 267 S.E.2d 539, 541 (S.C. 1980) (South
Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act § 39-5-40 specifically excludes actions or transactions
permitted under laws administered by any regulatory body or offices acting under statutory
authority of South Carolina); Kittilson v. Ford, 595 P.2d 944, 948 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979)
(Vashington Consumer Protection Act excludes actions or transactions otherwise regulated);
see Morris v. Gilbert, 649 F. Supp. 1491, 1497 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) ("[I]t is questionable that New
York's legislature intended to give securities investors an added measure of protection beyond
that provided by the Securities Act and, indeed, by RICO."); Singer v. Dean Witter Reynolds,
Inc., 614 F. Supp. 1141, 1145 (D. Mass. 1985) ("Because [the state securities statute] provides
a comprehensive regulatory scheme for the registration and sale of securities, the Legislature
did not intend.., to regulate the securities field."); In re Catanella, 583 F. Supp. 1388, 1443
(E.D. Pa. 1984) (New Jersey law) ("[T]he very existence of a carefully drawn state securities
statute militates against the application of the Consumer Fraud Act to securities transac-
tions."); Allais v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, 532 F. Supp. 749, 752 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (strict
liability actions under consumer fraud statute not applicable to securities transactions because
it conflicts with due diligence defense provided under state securities laws).
107. See Piedmont Funding, 382 A.2d at 819; McLeod, 267 S.E.2d at 539; Kittilson, 595
P.2d at 944.
108. See, e.g., Buie v. Daniel Int'l Corp., 289 S.E.2d 118 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982), reh'g de-
nied, 305 S.E.2d 574 (N.C. 1982); Bache Halsey Stuart, 248 S.E.2d at 567.
109. See Buie, 289 S.E.2d at 118; Bache Halsey Stuart, 248 S.E.2d at 567.
110. 761 F.2d 162 (4th Cir. 1985).
111. Id. at 165, 167; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-1.1 (1988) (unfair methods of competi-
tion and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce). The Lindner plaintiffs
appealed from a district court ruling dismissing their claim for relief under the North Carolina
Unfair Trade Practices Act. Lindner, 761 F.2d at 165. Plaintiffs, former minority sharehold-
ers, who owned Class B nonvoting stock in defendant's hosiery company, alleged that defend-
ants had deprived them of the fair market value of their stock by employing a reverse stock
split in connection with a merger. Id. at 163. The court held:
We do not believe that the North Carolina legislature would have intended § 75-1.1,
with its treble damages provision, to apply to securities transactions which were al-
ready subject to pervasive and intricate regulation under the North Carolina Securi-
ties Act .... Furthermore, to hold that § 75-1.1 applies to securities transactions
could subject those involved with securities transactions to overlapping supervision
and enforcement by both the North Carolina Attorney General, who is charged with
enforcing § 75-1.1, and the North Carolina Secretary of State, who is charged with
enforcing the North Carolina Securities Act.
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Although cases interpreting a consumer protection statute with a
specific exemption would be distinguishable from California's Act (be-
cause the Act does not employ a specific exemption for actions "other-
wise regulated") the dual regulation rationales set forth in these cases
and in Lindner (which similarly interpreted a statute without an other-
wise regulated exemption) should apply in California. Dual regulation
could result if claims based on securities violations were brought under
the Act. Investment securities are regulated under both the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934112 and the California Corporate-Securities Act.
1 3
Both of these laws provide specific remedies for deceptive or fraudulent
acts in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.1 4 The anti-
fraud provisions of the state and federal securities laws conflict" s di-
rectly with the Act because they do not provide for recovery of punitive
damages or attorneys' fees and the Act does." 6 Thus, the Act should not
be extended to apply to investment securities because federal and state
securities laws already regulate securities transactions and because the
remedies provided under the securities laws are inconsistent with those
provided under the Act.
B. Federal Authority
Many courts recognize that their consumer statutes were modeled
after the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA),' ' a federal consumer
Id. at 167-68 (citations omitted); see Bache Halsey Stuart, 248 S.E.2d at 567 (commodities
transactions not within North Carolina's Unfair Trade Practices Act).
112. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-iii (1988).
113. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25000-25706 (West 1977 & Supp. 1991).
114. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (1988); CAL. CORP. CODE §'25400 (West 1985 & Supp. 1991).
115. The conflict between the Act and California's corporate securities laws is illustrated by
the statutory construction principle of in pari materia, which requires that statutory schemes
be construed to be in harmony. Ex Parte Washer, 200 Cal. 598, 606, 254 P. 951, 955 (1927)
("A statute should be construed in light of other existing legislation touching the same subject-
matter and statutes in par materia are to be construed together."). To this end, the attorney's
fees and punitive damages provisions under the Act, see supra notes 8-9 and accompanying
text, are inconsistent with California's corporate securities laws, which do not provide for such
recovery. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 25000-25706 (West 1977 & Supp. 1991). In order to achieve a
harmonious construction of the Act and California's corporate securities laws, investment se-
curities must be found to be outside of the Act.
116. Compare Davis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 906 F.2d 1206, 1223 n.20
(8th Cir. 1990) (punitive damages not available for violations of section 10(b) of Securities
Exchange Act of 1934) and Bowden v. Robinson, 67 Cal. App. 3d 705, 714, 136 Cal. Rptr.
871, 878 (1977) (punitive damages available under anti-fraud provisions of California Corpo-
rate Securities Act) with CAL. CIV. CODE § 1780(a)(4), (d) (West 1985 & Supp. 1991) (puni-
tive damages and attorney's fees available under Consumers Legal Remedies Act).
117. 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1988). This statute allows the Federal Trade Commission to file
complaints against persons, partnerships or corporations that utilize unfair or deceptive trade
practices. Id. § 45(b).
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protection statute which provides consumers with a means for recovery
under federal law for unfair trade practices.' 1 8 In fact, some decisions
refer to the consumer protection statutes as "baby FTC statutes." '119
Some states' consumer statutes even state that they are to be construed in
accordance with Federal Trade Commission rulings and the federal stat-
ute.12 0 Even when statutes lack such directives, courts have relied on
federal law as a rationale for not including securities within the ambit of
their state consumer protection statutes because, under federal law, se-
curities are not included in the consumer statute. 21 The California Act,
however, does not state that it is to be construed in accordance with the
FTCA.'1 2 Nonetheless, because many other jurisdictions look to the fed-
eral statutes for guidance in interpreting consumer statutes,123 it is per-
suasive that no federal court has found the FTCA to include investment
securities.
C. Non-exclusivity Clauses
The non-exclusivity or "savings" clauses appearing in some con-
sumer statutes are an infrequently used rationale to determine whether
securities fall within the scope of a consumer protection statute. A non-
exclusivity or savings clause ensures that the remedies provided by the
statute will not be interpreted as the sole remedies available.' 24
In State ex rel. Corbin v. Pickrell, 21 the court relied upon Arizona's
consumer statute's savings clause to hold that securities claims were
118. Island Tobacco Co. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco, 627 P.2d 260, 268 (Haw. 1981); Manely
v. Wichita Business College, 701 P.2d 893, 898 (Kan. 1985); State ex rel. Guste, 528 So. 2d
198, 200 (La. Ct. App. 1988); Hangman Ridge Training Stables, Inc. v. Safeco Title Ins. Co.,
719 P.2d 531, 534 (Wash. 1986).
119. See, eg., Bulgo v. Munoz, 853 F.2d 710, 714 (9th Cir. 1988) (Hawaiian law); Spinner
Corp. v. Princeville Dev. Corp., 849 F.2d 388, 389 (9th Cir. 1988) (Hawaiian law).
120. See, eg., Aaiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1522B (1987 & Supp. 1990); HAW. REv. STAT.
§ 480-3 (1985 & Supp. 1990); see infra note 132.
121. See, eg., Lindner v. Durham Hosiery Mills, 761 F.2d 162, 166-67 (4th Cir. 1985)
(interpreting North Carolina law) ("We also find it significant that [North Carolina General
Statute] Section 75-1.1 ... is reproduced verbatim from Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C.
Section 45 (a)(1) (1982) .... it [is] appropriate to look to the federal decisions interpreting the
FTC Act for guidance .... Thus, the fact that no federal court decision has applied Section
5(a)(1) of the FTC Act to securities transactions is additional evidence of the scope of Section
75-1.1.").
122. See CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1750-1784 (West 1985 & Supp. 1991).
123. See supra note 121.
124. See State ex reL Corbin v. Pickrell, 667 P.2d 1304 (Ariz. 1983) (interpreting savings
clause as ensuring that remedies provided by statute will not be interpreted as exclusive
remedies).
125. 667 P.2d 1304 (Ariz. 1983).
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within the scope of their statute. 126 The court in Corbin considered the
issue of whether Arizona's consumer fraud statute permitted recovery for
securities violations.'27 A prior ruling by an Arizona appellate court
held that securities violations could not be brought under the consumer
fraud statute. 128 In that case, Babbitt v. Green Acres Trust,129 the court
based its holding on the theory that the Arizona legislature had not in-
tended to provide cumulative remedies. 130 The court stated that because
securities were already comprehensively regulated, it did not find that the
legislature "by enactment of the Consumer Fraud Act, intended to pro-
vide an additional avenue of relief" to plaintiffs.' 3 ' The court in Corbin
took the opposing view in light of an amendment passed by the Arizona
State Legislature after Babbitt but prior to Corbin.132 The amendment
provided in pertinent part: "The provisions of this article are in addition
to all other causes of action, remedies and penalties available to this
state."' 3 3 The court in Corbin relied upon this amendment to find that
the legislature did intend to include securities within the realm of the
consumer statute. 
134
California's Act contains similar savings-type provisions.1 35 These
provisions provide that the Act's remedies are in addition to other reme-
dies and procedures available. Under the reasoning in Corbin, the Cali-
fornia non-exclusive remedies and cumulative remedies provisions are a
strong argument that the legislature intended to include investment se-
126. Id. at 1307.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. 618 P.2d 1086 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980).
130. Id. at 1091.
131. Id.
132. Corbin, 667 P.2d at 1307.
133. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1533(A) (1987); see also id. § 44-1522(B) (stating in
part that "the courts may use as a guide interpretations given by the... federal courts").
134. Corbin, 667 P.2d at 1307 ("We believe that the clear language of the amendment man-
dates the conclusion that the legislature intended the consumer fraud act to provide an addi-
tional avenue of relief to those aggrieved by securities act violations.").
135. Section 1749.3 of the Act states in pertinent part: "The remedies provided by this title
are cumulative and shall not be construed as restricting any remedy that is otherwise avail-
able." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1749.3 (West 1991). Additionally, § 1752 provides:
The provisions of this title are not exclusive. The remedies provided herein for viola-
tion of any section of this title or for conduct proscribed by any section of this title
shall be in addition to any other procedures or remedies for any violation or conduct
provided for in any other law.
... If any act or practice proscribed under this title also constitutes a cause of
action in common law or a violation of another statute, the consumer may assert
such common law or statutory cause of action under the procedures and with the
remedies provided for in such law.
Id. § 1752 (West 1985 & Supp. 1991).
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curities under the Act. Under the Corbin rationale, a court could find
that the legislature intended for consumers to sue and recover under the
Act, as well as under other statutory and common law theories.
The lack of a cumulative or exclusive remedies provision in a con-
sumer fraud statute was used as a point of distinction by the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Spinner Corporation v. Princeville Devel-
opment. 136 The court in Spinner addressed the issue of whether Hawaii's
consumer protection statute applies to claims arising from securities
transactions. 137 The court relied upon "the structure of the statute, the
legislative command to refer to Federal Trade Commission Act jurispru-
dence, the existence of Hawaii statutes that cover securities transactions,
and the trend of the relatively few applicable judicial decisions" to deter-
mine that securities were not included.1 38 The court summarily distin-
guished Corbin: "The difference between this Arizona case and the
instant one is that the Hawaii baby FTC act does not contain a similar
savings clause." 139 In California such a savings clause does exist.
Although Corbin provides a valid argument for the view that invest-
ment securities fall within the realm of the Arizona Act, because that Act
has a savings clause, an important distinction can be made between it and
the California Act. California's cumulative and non-exclusive remedies
provisions are different from Arizona's because Arizona's savings clause
was arguably passed as a sign of legislative wrath at the Babbitt deci-
sion.1" The California Act's savings clauses were not enacted in re-
sponse to an appellate court decision excluding investment securities, but
in response to California's consumers' demands for redress.1 41 If a court
were to find that investment securities were intended to come within the
Act, the Spinner and Corbin decisions and the Act's extensive savings
clause would provide the best grounds.
136. 849 F.2d 388, 392 (9th Cir. 1988) (Hawaiian law).
137. Id. at 390.
138. Id. at 393.
139. Id. at 393 n.6.
140. See Corbin, 667 P.2d at 1307 (legislature's amendment to consumer fraud act
"stripped [Babbitt] of its" foundation").
141. The Act's savings clause was within the original statute when it was enacted in 1970,
however, it was further clarified by the amendment of 1975 and expanded to include:
[Tihis shall not be construed so as to deprive a consumer of any statutory or common
law right to bring a class action without resort to this title. If any act or practice
proscribed under this title also constitutes a cause of action in common law or a
violation of another statute, the consumer may assert such common law or statutory
cause of action under the procedures and with the remedies provided for in such law.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1752 (West 1985 & Supp. 1991).
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D. The Trend Toward Not Including Securities Within the Realm of
Consumer Protection Statutes
Fifteen out of the seventeen jurisdictions that have considered
whether investment securities are within the scope of their consumer pro-
tection statutes have held that claims based upon securities violations are
not within the ambit of their statutes.142 Many courts deciding this issue
cite the dearth of cases deciding that securities fall within consumer stat-
utes as a reason 'for deciding that claims based upon securities violations
are not within the ambit of their consumer protection statutes. The court
in Spinner Corp. v. Princeville Development 143 did just that. In deciding
that securities were not within Hawaii's consumer fraud statute, the
court stated that "we are persuaded by... the trend of the relatively few
applicable judicial decisions." 1" To date, only two jurisdictions have
held to the contrary.
145
V. CONCLUSION
A court presented with the issue of whether to apply the California
Consumers Legal Remedies Act to investment securities will be con-
fronted with numerous rationales with which to find that the legislature
did or did not intend investment securities to come within the meaning of
consumer goods or services. The most persuasive arguments supporting
the inclusion of investment securities within the Act are the "object of
the transaction" investment services line of cases in Texas and the Act's
142. Cases in jurisdictions that have determined that securities are not within the ambit of
their consumer protection statute include: Spinner Corp. v. Princeville Dev. Corp., 849 F.2d
388 (9th Cir. 1988) (Hawaiian law); Smith v. Cooper, 846 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1988) (Louisiana
law); Nichols v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 706 F. Supp. 1309 (M.D. Tenn. 1989);
Morris v. Gilbert, 649 F. Supp. 1491 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); Robertson v. White, 633 F. Supp. 954
(W.D. Ark. 1986) (interpreting Arkansas and Oklahoma law); In re Catanella, 583 F. Supp.
1388 (E.D. Penn. 1984); Taylor v. Bear Stearns & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Ga. 1983);
Russell v. Dean Witter, 510 A.2d 972 (Conn. 1986); Cabot Corp. v. Baddour, 477 N.E.2d 399
(Mass. 1985); Skinner v. E.F. Hutton, 333 S.E.2d 236 (N.C. 1985); State v. Piedmont Funding
Corp., 332 A.2d 694 (R.I. 1978); State ex rel McLeod v. Rhoades, 267 S.E.2d 539 (S.C. 1980);
Kittilson v. Ford, 595 P.2d 944 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979), aff'd, 608 P.2d 264 (Wash. 1980). All
federal jurisdictions also exclude investment securities from the scope of the Federal Trade
Commission Act. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (1988). Courts in Texas, as noted previously, have held
that goods or services under the DTPA do not include investment securities. See Portland
Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Gov't Sec., 619 S.W.2d 241, 245 ('ex. Civ.
App. 1981). However, as noted, this rule is being eroded and many courts permit recovery for
securities transactions under the DTPA. See, eg., FDIC v. Munn, 804 F.2d 860, 863-64 (5th
Cir. 1986) (whether or not plaintiff's claim fell under DTPA was question for jury).
143. 849 F.2d 388, 393 (9th Cir. 1988).
144. Id.
145. See Corbin, 667 P.2d 1304 (Ariz.); Frizzell v. Cook, 790 S.W.2d 41 (rex. Ct. App.
1990).
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extensive savings clause provisions. Several potential arguments exist,
however, with which to attack these theories: the underlying consumer
focus of the Act, as revealed in the Act's own language, its legislative
history and its application to date; the dearth of jurisdictions which have
applied consumer statutes to investment securities; and the presence of
dual regulation and inconsistent remedies. Although other jurisdictions'
statutes are necessarily distinguishable because each statute is different,
the underlying rationales provide strong reasons for not. applying the Act
to investment securities. Ultimately, it is the plain consumer language of
the Act itself which suggests that investment securities should not be
construed to be within the scope of the Act.
